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Recent research indicates that angry facial expressions are preferentially processed and
may facilitate automatic avoidance response, especially in socially anxious individuals.
However, few studies have examined whether this bias also expresses itself in more
complex cognitive processes and behavior such as decisionmaking.We recently introduced
a variation of the Iowa GamblingTask which allowed us to document the inﬂuence of task-
irrelevant emotional cues on rational decision making. The present study used a modiﬁed
gambling task to investigate the impact of angry facial expressions on decision making
in 38 individuals with a wide range of social anxiety. Participants were to ﬁnd out which
choices were (dis-) advantageous to maximize overall gain. To create a decision conﬂict
between approach of reward and avoidance of fear-relevant angry faces, advantageous
choices were associated with angry facial expressions, whereas disadvantageous choices
were associated with happy facial expressions. Results indicated that higher social
avoidance predicted less advantageous decisions in the beginning of the task, i.e.,
when contingencies were still uncertain. Interactions with speciﬁc skin conductance
responses further clariﬁed that this initial avoidance only occurred in combination with
elevated responses before choosing an angry facial expressions. In addition, an interaction
between high trait anxiety and elevated responses to early losses predicted faster learning
of an advantageous strategy. These effects were independent of intelligence, general
risky decision-making, self-reported state anxiety, and depression. Thus, socially avoidant
individuals who respond emotionally to angry facial expressions are more likely to show
avoidance of these faces under uncertainty. This novel laboratory paradigm may be an
appropriate analog for central features of social anxiety.
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INTRODUCTION
Avoidance is the characteristic action tendency associated with
anxiety (Hofmann et al., 2009). It is triggered by emotional
responses toward speciﬁc fear-relevant stimuli and can pro-
tect these emotional responses from extinction (Lovibond et al.,
2009). Adaptive behavior, however, requires the individual to
obtain reward or positive consequences. Investigating avoidance
by itself, therefore, only accounts for one side of a two-sided bal-
ance between avoidance and approach (Stein and Paulus, 2009).
This broader view on avoidance takes into account that anxious
individuals miss out on potential beneﬁts and therefore suffer
costs. In social anxiety, these two tendencies are often in conﬂict
with each other, because socially anxious individuals are explic-
itly aware of lost beneﬁts, even for their most feared situations
(Kashdan et al., 2008). For example, socially anxious individu-
als are often afraid of job interviews, although they are aware of
the potential beneﬁts for their career. Thus, they are in a con-
ﬂict of opposing choices; to approach these beneﬁts or avoid
the situation to reduce anxiety. Pathological avoidance is, there-
fore, indicated by a dysfunctional shift toward avoidant decisions
(Stein and Paulus, 2009). This shift results in the loss of bene-
ﬁts, which illustrates the impairments of patients with anxiety
disorders. Studies investigating avoidance in the context of an
approach–avoidance conﬂict in anxious individuals should, there-
fore, account for both fear-relevant as well as reward-related
stimuli and consequences.
We recently combined these features in a novel experimental
paradigm to investigate behavioral avoidance as a decision-making
process (Pittig et al., 2014a). The paradigm was based on the Iowa
gambling task (Bechara et al., 1994, 2000). In our modiﬁed gam-
bling task, spider fearful participants continuously had to make
decisions with the goal to maximize overall gains. Advantageous
choices to obtain this goal were, however, associated with fear-
relevant stimuli (i.e., pictures of spiders), such that avoidance of
the fear-relevant stimuli resulted in the loss of long-term gains.
In comparison to non-fearful participants, spider fearful partic-
ipants consistently avoided the fear-relevant stimuli, despite the
fact that these avoidant decisions resulted in overall cost in task
performance. In addition, such avoidant decisions can result not
only from speciﬁc fear-relevant stimuli, such as spiders, but also
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from novel fear conditioning experience, especially in anxious
individuals (Pittig et al., 2014b). Thus, these laboratory experi-
ments show that the presence of fear-relevant stimuli can trigger
avoidant decisions in fearful individuals. As approach–avoidance
conﬂicts are particularly relevant to social anxiety, we hypothesize
that a similar bias may be observed in socially anxious individ-
uals when confronted with stimuli speciﬁcally relevant to social
interactions.
Facial expressions are one of the most important stimuli in
social situations and determine the individual’s social behaviors.
Emotional facial expressions are processed preferentially in the
visual system (e.g., Alpers and Gerdes, 2007; Bublatzky et al.,
2014b) and result in speciﬁc behavioral responses (Eisenbarth
et al., 2011; Gerdes et al., 2012; Neumann et al., 2014). Angry facial
expression are biologically rooted signals of threat (Öhman, 1986)
and are speciﬁcally fear-relevant in subclinical and clinical levels
of social anxiety. In support, recent research has pointed to a pref-
erential processing of angry faces in healthy individuals (Mogg
and Bradley, 1999; Fox et al., 2000). This preferential processing is
pronounced in socially anxious individuals (Gilboa-Schechtman
et al., 1999; Mogg et al., 2004; Klumpp and Amir, 2009; Wieser
et al., 2009), which is accompanied by elevated amygdala activity
in patients with social anxiety disorder (SAD; Stein et al., 2002).
In addition, facial expressions can inﬂuence approach or avoid-
ance tendencies. In this regard, approach-related motor responses
are faster for happy faces, whereas avoidance-related responses are
facilitated by angry faces (Marsh et al., 2005; Seidel et al., 2010).
The difference in approach toward happy and angry faces is
also evident in whole-body movements (Stins et al., 2011). The
effect of a stronger avoidance response to angry faces may be
elevated in socially anxious individuals, although a similar ten-
dency was found for happy faces (Heuer et al., 2007). Finally,
recent ﬁndings suggest that the difference in approach or avoid-
ance tendencies is most pronounced when comparing angry to
happy faces (Horstmann, 2003; Marsh et al., 2005; Seidel et al.,
2010). Thus, confrontation with angry facial stimuli (compared
to happy facial stimuli) may trigger avoidant decisions in socially
anxious individuals.
There is indeed ﬁrst evidence that angry facial expressions
may generally bias rational decisions in healthy individuals (Aver-
beck and Duchaine, 2009; Furl et al., 2012). In these studies,
the participants’ task was to ﬁnd out whether selecting either
a happy or an angry facial expression yielded more frequent
reward. In general, decisions were biased toward selecting the
happy face, even if prior evidence favored the angry facial
expressions as advantageous choice (Averbeck and Duchaine,
2009). This effect of angry facial expressions on rational deci-
sions may be more pronounced in socially anxious individu-
als. However, levels of social anxiety were not controlled in
previous studies. To address this issue in order to evaluate
whether repeated decisions are altered by subclinical levels of
social anxiety and a tendency for social avoidance, the present
study used a gambling task in which advantageous decisions
were linked to angry facial expressions (similar to Pittig et al.,
2014a,b).
In the ﬁeld of decision making, several theories have stressed
a general impact of emotional experience on decisions (Bechara
et al., 1997; Loewenstein et al., 2001). These theories provide a
powerful framework to investigate potential predictors of avoidant
decisions in socially anxious individuals. For example, somatic
marker theory (Damasio et al., 1991) suggests that emotional
responses which are based on previous experience and activated
during decision making can alter subsequent decisions. These
responses are seen as embodied markers (or so called “gut-
feelings”) which are linked to speciﬁc choices. Recent research
on somatic markers using the Iowa gambling task or related
paradigms typically investigated skin conductance responses
(SCRs) as correlates and predictors of decisions (Bechara et al.,
1997; Suzuki et al., 2003; Lawrence et al., 2006; Starcke et al., 2009;
Pittig et al., 2014b). Importantly, the processing of facial expres-
sions, especially angry expressions, is also related to physiological
responses (Johnsen et al., 1995; Stein et al., 2002; Springer et al.,
2007; Anokhin and Golosheykin, 2010; for an overview see Alpers
et al., 2011). Thus, if angry facial expressions are presented dur-
ing the consideration of different options, emotional responses to
these faces may bias subsequent decisions, especially in socially
anxious individuals. Since emotional responses to fear-relevant
stimuli habituate with repeated presentation (Bradley et al., 1993;
Bublatzky et al., 2014a), a potential bias on decisions should also
be most pronounced for initial presentations. However, only one
study so far reported that elevated SCRs can generalize form fear
conditioning and subsequently predictmore pronounced avoidant
decisions (Pittig et al., 2014b). To this respect, the present study
used SCRs as indicators of emotional arousal during social chal-
lenges (Schulz et al., 2008) and especially during decision-making
(see Bechara et al., 1997; Adolphs, 2002).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Thirty-eight students at UCLA participated for partial course
credit. Exclusion criteria were assessed through self-report screen-
ing before the assessment and included any serious medical
conditions, substance abuse/dependence, current/history of bipo-
lar disorder, psychosis, organic/traumatic brain damage, and
current use of psychotropic medications or medications that
may inﬂuence autonomic state. All participants provided writ-
ten informed consent. All procedures were approved by the
UCLA Internal Review Board. Demographic, questionnaire, and
neuropsychological data of the sample are shown in Table 1.
PROCEDURES
After informed consent was given, electrodes for the physiologi-
cal measures were attached. Subsequently, participants completed
a questionnaire battery including the self-rating form of the
Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS-SR; Fresco et al., 2001),
the trait version of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-T;
Spielberger et al., 1983), and the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-
II; Beck et al., 1996). The LSAS is a 24-item questionnaire,
commonly used to assess anxiety and avoidance in social interac-
tion and performance situations. It has shown very good internal
consistency, as well as good convergent and divergent validity
(Heimberg et al., 1999). Participants rate each item twice, in terms
of level of fear or anxiety (0 = “none”; 3 = “severe”; LSAS-
Anxiety), and frequency of avoidance (0 = “never”; 3 = “usually”;
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Table 1 | Demographical, clinical, and neuropsychological data of the
sample.
Mean SD
N (female) 38 (24)
Age 19.89 (1.71)
SPIN 18.55 (14.49)
LSAS – fear scale 22.66 (13.88)
LSAS – avoidance scale 19.61 (13.63)
STAI – trait 36.61 (11.25)
STAI – state 30.47 (7.32)
BDI 5.28 (4.31)
GDT 6.26 (8.75)
IQ (based on LPS-4) 125.00 (12.10)
Means (and SD) for demographic, questionnaire, and neuropsychological data
of the whole sample. N, number of participants; SPIN, social phobia inventory
(Connor et al., 2000); LSAS, Liebowitz social anxiety scale (Fresco et al., 2001);
STAI, state-trait anxiety inventory (Spielberger et al., 1983); BDI, beck depression
inventory (Beck et al., 1996); GDT, game of dice-task (Brand et al., 2005); LPS-4,
performance test system – subtest 4 (Horn, 1983).
LSAS-Avoidance). The social anxiety and avoidance scales served
as main predictors in the present study.
Trait anxiety has been shown to inﬂuence decision making in
the original Iowa gambling task. Although resultsweremixed (Miu
et al., 2008;Werner et al., 2009), these studies demonstrate theneed
to control for general levels of unspeciﬁc trait anxiety. This was
done with the 20-item STAI-T. The BDI is a self-report inventory
which contains 21 items to measure the severity of depression. The
BDI was used as a control measure, because depression symptoms
may be associated with altered processing of reward (Mineka et al.,
1998; Eshel and Roiser, 2010).
After a subsequent 5 min quiet sitting baseline, participants
indicated their current state anxiety by completing the state version
of the STAI.Afterward, they completed the gambling task, followed
by the additional neuropsychological tasks. As the gambling task
was always the ﬁrst task to be completed, it was not inﬂuenced by
the other tasks.
Social anxiety gambling task
The gambling task was used to measure the impact of presentation
of angry facial expressions on decision making. It was modeled
after the Iowa gambling task (Bechara et al., 1994, 2000), see the
screenshot in Figure 1. The task comprised four decks of cards (A,
B, C, and D). Card backs depicted pictures of two happy facial
expressions (decks A and B) and two angry facial expressions
(decks C and D; all pictures approximately 9.15◦ × 5.73◦ visual
angle). The pictures were taken from the Karolinska Directed
Emotional Faces (KDEF; Lundqvist et al., 1998), a well validated
picture set with moderately expressive facial expressions (Adolph
and Alpers, 2010). Due to copyright terms of the KDEF, place-
holders are used in Figure 1. Referring to the KDEF database
the following pictures were displayed on the speciﬁc decks: deck
A = AF01HAS, deck B = AM01HAS, deck C = AF21ANS, deck
D = AM10ANS. Participants had to select one card at a time from
FIGURE 1 | Screenshot of the social anxiety gambling task with
placeholders. Disadvantageous decks (A′,B′) are depicting happy facial
expressions, whereas advantageous decks (C′,D′) depict angry facial
expressions.White squares in the middle of each deck represent the
mouse-sensitive area where participants had to click to make a selection.
one of the decks in a total of 100 trials. The mouse sensitive area
for selecting a deck was reduced to a small square in the middle
of each deck (approximately 0.57◦ visual angle), so that selecting
a card required a ﬁxation of the corresponding picture. After each
trial, the mouse pointer moved back to the middle of the screen
and had to be moved to the square again. Thus, each selection
always required the participant to look at the corresponding deck
and the depicted facial expression. After each selection a transpar-
ent gray shading of the decks was used to visualize this selection.
This transparency ensured that the facial expressions were still
visible, so that the selection could not be used as an avoidance
strategy.
In order to compare physiological responses in each trial, there
was another difference compared to the original Iowa gambling
task. After each choice participants received feedback if they won
or lost a speciﬁc amount of virtual money. In the original Iowa
gambling task, gains and losses could occur simultaneously in one
trial (Bechara et al., 1994, 2000). In contrast, in the present study
participants could either win or lose on each trial to maintain a
consistent single feedback after each trial.
Overall, decks A and B yielded large immediate gains, but occa-
sionally even larger losses, resulting in long-term loss (−250 $
per 10 selections), and are considered disadvantageous choices
for the goal of maximizing overall gain. The disadvantageous
decks always depicted the two happy facial expressions. In con-
trast, decks C and D yielded small immediate gains, but also
small occasional losses. Therefore, they resulted in long-term
gains (+250 $ per 10 selections) and are considered advanta-
geous choices. The advantageous decks always depicted the two
angry facial expressions. Thus, to choose advantageously during
the task, participants had to select the pictures of the angry facial
expressions. As we focused on simulating the approach–avoidance
conﬂict in individuals with elevated levels of social anxiety, we
only investigated the link between advantageous choices and angry
faces.
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Participants were instructed to freely choose between the four
decks with the goal to maximize their virtual monetary gains. In
the beginning, they were not aware of the contingencies for gains
and losses or the duration of the task. Hence, they had to use
continuous feedback of gains and losses in order to learn which
decks were advantageous or disadvantageous. Each participant
started with a positive balance of $2000 and could continue to
play even if they lost the entire starting amount. Analogous to
analyses of the Iowa gambling task (e.g., Bechara et al., 2000), the
100 trials of the gambling task were analyzed in ﬁve blocks of 20
trials each. The number of advantageous choices from decks C
and D was used as the dependent variable. Higher scores indicate
a higher overall outcome in the task due to choosing advantageous
decks with angry facial expressions.
After completing the task, participants were asked to rate the
pictures of each facial expression. All ratings were given on a
10-point Likert scale for valence/pleasantness (0 = “very unpleas-
ant”; 9 = “very pleasant”) and arousal (0 = “not at all aroused”;
9 = “extremely aroused”).
Neuropsychological control measures
Risky decision making: game of dice task. The game of dice task
(GDT; Brand et al., 2005) is a computerized dice task and was
administered to control for general differences in risky decision
making independent of fear-relevant stimuli. A virtual dice is
thrown and participants are asked to maximize a ﬁctitious starting
capital by guessing the correct number thrown in 18 trials. Partic-
ipants can guess a single number or two, three, or four numbers
together. If the guess matches the thrown number, participants
win a speciﬁc amount of virtual money. If not, they lose the same
amount. Non-risky choices have a winning probability of 50% or
higher and are linked to lower gains (i.e., a combination of three
numbers with a 50% probability to win 200 € and a combination
of four numbers with a 66.67% probability to win 100 €). Risky
choices have a lower winning probability, but are linked to higher
gains (i.e., a single number with 16.67% probability to win 1000
€ or a combination of two numbers with a 33.33% probability to
win 500 €). For analysis, a net score was calculated by subtract-
ing the number of risky choices from the number of safe choices.
Thus, a higher net score indicates more non-risky choices.
Logical reasoning: performance test. Potential differences in
reasoning abilities were controlled using the Performance test sys-
tem – Subtest 4 (LPS-4; Horn, 1983). This was done because such
differences can inﬂuence decision making in the Iowa gambling
task (Bechara et al., 1997). The LPS-4 is a non-verbal test used to
estimate logical reasoning. Participants have 8 min to ﬁnd a single
error in a logical order of letters and numbers in a total of 40 rows.
The number of errors correctly identiﬁed can be used to estimate
the logical reasoning skills and intelligence of the participant.
PHYSIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT
Electrodermal activity (EDA) was continuously recorded as mea-
sure of emotional responses during decision making using
BIOPAC instrumentation (MP150 Data Acquisition System for
Windows; BIOPAC Systems, Inc.). Data monitoring, acquisition,
and analysis were conducted with AcqKnowledge software (Acq-
Knowledge 4.1; BIOPAC Systems, Inc.). One disposable Ag/AgCl
electrode on the left clavicle served as ground electrode. EDA
was recorded using BIOPAC skin conductance instrumentation
with a constant voltage of 0.5 V (sampling rate = 62.50 Hz). Two
disposable Ag/AgCl electrodes with electrodermal conducting gel
were attached to the palmar surface of the middle phalanges of
the second and third ﬁngers of the non-dominant hand. Partic-
ipants were instructed to avoid larger movement as to not bias
the physiological responses. Data recording was monitored online
and artifacts (e.g., movement, sneezing, etc.) were recorded by a
research assistant who observed the assessment from an adjacent
room. All sections with such events were removed from further
analysis.
Skin conductance responses
Each choice during the gambling task was ﬂagged by a digital
marker. SCRs were analyzed for two intervals (see Bechara et al.,
1997; Starcke et al., 2009): feedback SCRs were analyzed in the 5 s
following each choice and anticipatory SCRs were analyzed 5 s
before every choice. Six second intervals between two consecutive
choices allowed sufﬁcient time to score both types of SCRswithout
serious overlaps (Bechara et al., 1999; Starcke et al., 2009). The
mean interval time between two consecutive choices in the present
study was 10.71 s (SD = 0.93).
EDA data were ﬁltered with a digital low-pass 2 Hz FIR ﬁlter. A
0.05 Hz FIR high-pass ﬁlter was used to obtain phasic SCRs. SCRs
were calculated as the maximum increase in skin conductance
during 5 s before and after each choice. A threshold of 0.02 Mirco-
Siemens (μS) was used; all SCRs below this threshold were scored
as zero (zero responses were included in the calculation of mean
responses). For range correction, SCRs were divided by the largest
SCR of each participant (SCR corrected = SCR raw/SCR maxi-
mum; Lykken and Venables, 1971) and the square root was taken
to obtain normal distribution (Dawson et al., 2007). Skin conduc-
tance recordings could not be analyzed for two participants due to
equipment failure.
The present analyses focused on SCRs during the ﬁrst block of
the gambling task in order to predict subsequent choices, because
the impact of SCRs was expected to be strongest in initial trials.
SCRs of the ﬁrst blockwere analyzed in six different SCR categories
(see Bechara et al., 1999; Starcke et al., 2009); two anticipatory SCR
categories (before choosing an advantageous vs. disadvantageous
deck) and four feedback SCR categories that were subdivided by
deck (after choosing an advantageous vs. disadvantageous deck)
and outcome (win vs. loss).
STATISTICAL ANALYSES
All questionnaire data were examined for outliers (deﬁned as
values >2.5 SD from the mean) and for normal distribution.
Detected outliers (0.19% of all data) were replaced with the clos-
est, non-outlier value (Winsor method; see Guttman, 1973).
Hierarchical linear growth curve models (HLMs with random
intercept and random slope) were built with gambling task scores
as the dependent variable to model repeated decisions (level-1)
nested in different individuals (level-2) using HLM 6.08 software
(Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002; Raudenbush et al., 2004). HLM is
particularly well-suited for the analysis of repeated data, because
it does not require independence of observations for repeated
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observations and produces lower Type I error rates than standard
GLM procedures (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002).
Examination of the raw data and a non-signiﬁcant result for
quadratic change over blocks resulted in the use of linear level-1
components to model gambling task scores (i.e., changes across
blocks were modeled in a linear way). Both intercept and slope
for the unconditional linear model showed signiﬁcant variabil-
ity. Therefore, gambling task blocks (block 1–5) were entered
as the repeated level-1 predictor. On level-2, the different clini-
cal and neuropsychological variables were entered to test if these
variables predicted gambling task scores for the ﬁrst block (inter-
cept) and linear change across blocks (slope). All variables were
mean-centered before being entered into the model and before
interaction terms were calculated to reduce multicollinearity. For
interaction analyses, multiplication terms were entered together
with their corresponding main effect variables. To investigate
the impact of social anxiety and avoidance on decision mak-
ing, the effects of self-reported social anxiety (LSAS-Anxiety) and
social avoidance (LSAS-Avoidance)were tested on level-2. Further,
effects of the additional control variables were tested in a similar
way, including trait anxiety (STAI-T), state anxiety (STAI-State),
depression (BDI), intelligence (LPS-4), and general risky deci-
sion making (GDT). Before building a combined model including
multiple predictors, each predictor was separately tested on level-2
to ensure that a potential effect was not covered by the effect of
another variable or poor statistical power. Afterward, signiﬁcant
predictors were combined in one model to test for incremental
predictive effects. In addition, potential incremental effects of the
different SCRs generated during the ﬁrst block were investigated
by entering SCRs of the six categories on level-2. To this end, inter-
action terms between anxiety or social avoidance and the different
SCRs as well as main effects of the SCRs were entered into the
model.
Tests of HLM assumptions did not yield serious violations.
Assumptions were tested using the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test for
normal distribution of level-1 and level-2 residuals, a χ2 test for
homogeneity of level-1 residual variance, and visual inspection
of scatterplots. Reported R2 effect sizes represent the proportion
of variance explained by adding the level-2 variables; these effect
sizes were calculated by subtracting the variance obtained with the
level-2 predictors from the variance obtained without the level-
2 predictor, and dividing by the latter (Raudenbush and Bryk,
2002). R2 valueswere separately calculated for bothHLM intercept
and linear slope. In addition, the level-1-only model (without any
level-2 predictors) served as a reference model to evaluate if the
observed data were better explained by adding the level-2 variables
to the model. Therefore, a χ2 variance-covariance components
based likelihood test was used (see Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002).
RESULTS
GAMBLING TASK PERFORMANCE
Means and SD of choices from the advantageous decks for the ﬁve
blocks of the gambling task yielded sufﬁcient variance for regres-
sion analyses, see Figure 2 (block 1: M = 7.18, SD = 2.30; block
2: M = 8.40, SD = 3.03; block 3: M = 9.23, SD = 4.56; block
4: M = 9.60, SD = 4.24; block 5: M = 10.30, SD = 4.32). The
level-1-onlymodel including blocks (no level-2 predictors) yielded
FIGURE 2 | Means (with SE) of the number of choices from deck C + D.
Higher scores indicate more frequent choices from the advantageous
decks depicting angry facial expressions.
signiﬁcantly fewer advantageous choices with angry facial expres-
sions in block 1, B = 7.42, SE = 0.35, t(36) = −7.30, p < 0.001,
and a signiﬁcant linear increase across blocks, B = 0.64, SE = 0.16,
t(36) = 3.96, p < 0.001. So, all participants combined made fewer
advantageous choices with angry facial expressions at the begin-
ning and successively learned to make more advantageous choices.
Learning was also evident in the assessment of individual contin-
gency awareness1. However, at the end of the task all participants
combineddidnot showa clear preference toward the advantageous
deck, as indicated by Figure 2.
EFFECT OF SOCIAL ANXIETY AND SOCIAL AVOIDANCE ON DECISION
MAKING
In the HLM with social avoidance as only level-2 predictor,
higher social avoidancepredicted fewer advantageous choices from
the decks with angry facial expressions in block 1 (intercept),
B = −0.06, SE = 0.02, t(36) = −3.64, p = 0.001. In the HLM
with social anxiety as only level-2 predictor, higher social anxiety
yielded a similar effect, but with a smaller effect size, B = −0.05,
SE = 0.02, t(36) = −2.31, p = 0.027. In both HLMs, no effect
was found for change across blocks for social anxiety, B = 0.01,
SE = 0.02, t(36) = 0.70, p = 0.489, or social avoidance, B = 0.01,
SE = 0.01, t(36) = 0.88, p = 0.386.
EFFECT OF CONTROL VARIABLES ON DECISION MAKING
For all following results the speciﬁc control variable was entered
as single level-2 predictor into an HLM with blocks entered as
repeated level-1 factor. In the HLM with trait anxiety as only
1Participants were asked about their contingency knowledge after the task (see also
Bechara et al., 1997; Maia and McClelland, 2004): (1) “Tell me all you know about
what is going on in this game?”, (2) “Did you ﬁnd any difference between the
decks?”, (3) “Suppose you select 10 new card from deck A (B, C, D) will you on
average win or lose money?”, (4) “If you have to choose only one deck, which
one will you choose in order to maximize your long-term gain?”. Participants were
judged as having explicitly learned the correct contingencies, if they indicated correct
answers to question 3 and 4. Seventy four percent of the participants were judged
to be explicitly aware of the contingencies. In addition, analyses that only include
participants judged as aware of contingencies yielded the same pattern of results as
analyses including the entire sample.
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level-2 predictor, higher trait anxiety predicted fewer advanta-
geous choices from the decks with angry facial expressions in block
1 (intercept), B = −0.07, SE = 0.03, t(36) = −2.84, p = 0.008,
but had no effect on change across blocks, B = −0.01, SE = 0.02,
t(36) = −0.62, p = 0.538. In addition, when depression scores were
entered alone on level-2, higher depression scores also predicted
fewer advantageous choices in block 1, B = −0.18, SE = 0.08,
t(36) = −2.17, p = 0.036, but did not show a signiﬁcant effect on
change across blocks, B = 0.01, SE = 0.03, t(36) = 0.35, p = 0.732.
For all other HLMs with a single control variable as predictor,
the effects on intercept and slope were not signiﬁcant: (1) age:
intercept: B = 0.03, SE = 0.21, t(36) = 0.13, p = 0.898, slope:
B = −0.13, SE = 0.10, t(36) = −1.40, p = 0.171; (2) sex: inter-
cept: B = −0.45, SE = 0.69, t(36) = −0.66, p = 0.517, slope:
B = −0.21, SE = 0.39, t(36) = −0.54, p = 0.591; (3) state anxiety:
intercept: B = −0.08, SE = 0.05, t(36) = −1.68, p = 0.101, slope:
B < 0.01, SE = 0.02, t(36) = 0.07, p = 0.946; (4) GDT: intercept:
B = 0.01, SE = 0.04, t(36) = 0.23, p = 0.819, Slope: B = 0.02,
SE = 0.02, t(36) = 0.73, p = 0.468; (5) Estimated IQ (LPS-4):
intercept: B = −0.02, SE = 0.03, t(36) = −0.57, p = 0.572, Slope:
B < 0.01, SE = 0.02, t(36) = 0.50, p = 0.622.
Next level-2 predictors which yielded signiﬁcant effects when
entered as single level-2 predictor were combined in one model
to test incremental predictive power. In the model including
social avoidance and anxiety, trait anxiety, and depression scores,
only social avoidance, B = −0.04, SE = 0.01, t(35) = −2.39,
p = 0.023, and trait anxiety, B = −0.05, SE = 0.02, t(35) = −2.20,
p = 0.034, incrementally predicted fewer advantageous choices
from the decks with angry facial expressions in block 1. In the
combined model, no signiﬁcant effect was found for social anxiety,
B = −0.03, SE = 0.03, t(35) = 1.10, p = 0.281, or depres-
sion, B = −0.08, SE = 0.12, t(34) = −0.70, p = 0.488. In
addition, no variable predicted linear change across blocks in
the combined model; social avoidance, B = 0.01, SE = 0.01,
t(35) = 1.75, p = 0.089, social anxiety, B = 0.02, SE = 0.02,
t(35) = 1.24, p = 0.225, trait anxiety, B = −0.02, SE = 0.02,
t(35) = −1.26, p = 0.217. Thus, social anxiety and depression
scoreswere dropped from themodel. The inclusionof social avoid-
ance and trait anxiety on level-2 resulted in signiﬁcantly lessmodel
deviance of observed from estimated data compared to the level-
1-only model, χ2 = 8.98, p = 0.003. In summary, after analysis
of the additional variables, social avoidance and trait anxiety both
yielded signiﬁcant beta weights and were the only variables show-
ing incremental predictive values in a model with more than just
one predictor.
EFFECTS OF TRAIT ANXIETY AND SOCIAL AVOIDANCE ON
SUBSEQUENT BLOCKS
To further investigate if the effects of self-reported social avoid-
ance and trait anxiety were consistent throughout the task, the
intercept analyses were repeated for block 2–5. For STAI-T, the
effects were signiﬁcant for all subsequent blocks; block 2, inter-
cept: B = −0.07, SE = 0.02, t(35) = −3.28, p = 0.003; block 3,
intercept: B = −0.09, SE = 0.03, t(35) = −2.99, p = 0.006; block
4, intercept: B = −0.11, SE = 0.04, t(35) = −2.54, p = 0.016;
and block 5, intercept: B = −0.13, SE = 0.06, t(35) = −2.24,
p = 0.032. In contrast, the effects for LSAS-Avoidance were
not signiﬁcant beyond block 1; block 2, intercept: B = −0.02,
SE = 0.02, t(35) = −1.11, p = 0.277; block 3, intercept:
B = −0.01, SE = 0.03, t(35) = −0.17, p = 0.870; block 4, inter-
cept: B = 0.01, SE = 0.04, t(35) = 0.32, p = 0.750; and block 5,
intercept: B = 0.03, SE = 0.05, t(35) = 0.59, p = 0.560. Thus, self-
reported trait anxiety consistently predicted fewer advantageous
choices from the decks with angry facial expressions throughout
the task, whereas social avoidance had an impact only in the ﬁrst
block.
INTERACTIONS WITH EMOTIONAL RESPONSES DURING DECISION
MAKING
Initial decisions: social avoidance and SCRs
In order to evaluate the inﬂuence of emotional responses during
decisionmaking, the different SCR categories and their interaction
with social avoidance and trait anxiety were analyzed in different
HLMs (each included the main effect of the speciﬁc SCR category,
social avoidance and trait anxiety, and the interaction terms). For
intercept analyses, no signiﬁcant main effects on intercept were
found for any of the SCR categories of block 1, all ts < 1.90, all
ps > 0.08. In addition, no interaction effects on intercept were
found between SCRs in block 1 and trait anxiety, all ts < 1.70, all
ps > 0.10. However, analyses yielded a signiﬁcant interaction of
social avoidance and anticipatory SCRs before choosing an advan-
tageous deck with angry facial expressions, B = −0.43, SE = 0.16,
t(32) = −2.62, p = 0.015. In order to illustrate the signiﬁcant
interaction, results were compared for different levels of the pre-
dictors (social avoidance andanticipatory SCRsbefore choosing an
advantageous deck with angry facial expressions). Therefore, high
and low scores for social avoidance and the anticipatory SCRs of
the present sample were calculated by using mean scores for the
upper and lower quartile. These scores for low and high levels were
entered back into the regression and estimated results for high
and low scores were plotted for visual interpretation of the inter-
action. Figure 3 illustrates that in the ﬁrst block, only high social
avoidance in combinationwithhigher anticipatory SCRspredicted
less frequent choices of the advantageous decks with angry facial
expressions. No further interactions between SCR categories and
social avoidance were found, all ts < 0.65, all ps > 0.54.
Learning of advantageous decisions: trait anxiety and SCRs
Slope analyses were conducted with the same predictors as inter-
cept analyses (main and interaction effect of social avoidance, trait
anxiety, and the single SCR categories). No signiﬁcant main effects
on slope were found for any of the SCR categories, all ts < 1.00, all
ps > 0.33. In addition, no interaction effects on slope were found
for interactions between SCR categories and social avoidance, and
most of the interaction effects between SCR categories and trait
anxiety, all ts < 1.30, all ps > 0.21. However, the interaction
between SCRs after loss feedbacks (for both advantageous and
disadvantageous decks) and trait anxiety signiﬁcantly predicted
change across the task, B = 0.20, SE = 0.07, t(32) = 2.77, p = 0.010.
Figure 4 illustrates that high trait anxiety combined with lower
SCRs after losses resulted in decreased learning. However, a steeper
learning curve occurred in high trait anxious participants, if par-
ticipants showed higher SCRs to losses in the initial block of the
task.
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FIGURE 3 | Interaction illustration by HLM estimated number of
choices from deck C + D in the first block of the social anxiety
gambling task for high vs. low social avoidance with high vs. low skin
conductance responses (SCRs) before choosing an advantageous deck
with angry facial expressions. Mean scores of the upper and lower
quartile were used to illustrate the interaction effect. Higher scores indicate
more frequent choices from the advantageous decks depicting angry facial
expressions.
FIGURE 4 | Interaction illustration by HLM estimated number of
choices from deck C + D for high vs. low self-reported trait anxiety
with high vs. low skin conductance responses (SCRs) after loss
feedbacks in the first block of the social anxiety gambling task. Mean
scores of the upper and lower quartile were used to illustrate the
interaction effect. Higher scores indicate more frequent choices from the
advantageous decks depicting angry facial expressions. Positive slopes
indicate increased learning of advantageous choices.
Finally, only the two signiﬁcant interaction terms (social avoid-
ance and anticipatory SCRs before choosing an advantageous deck
for intercept; trait anxiety and SCRs after losses for slope) as well
as the corresponding main effects were included into one model to
test for incremental effects of the interaction terms. The inclusion
yielded signiﬁcantly less deviances of observed data from modeled
data compared to themodel with trait anxiety and social avoidance
only, χ2 = 13.46, p = 0.001. Compared to the level-1-only model,
inclusion of the level-2 predictors explained additional variance of
initial decisions in block 1 (R2 = 0.23) and change across blocks
(R2 = 0.10).
PICTURE RATINGS
After completion of the gambling task, both pictures with angry
facial expressions (female angry face: M = 1.81; SD = 1.35; male
angry face: M = 1.97; SD = 1.46) were rated as signiﬁcantly less
pleasant compared to the happy facial expressions (female happy
face: M = 7.44; SD = 1.42; male happy face: M = 6.75; SD = 1.57),
all ts > 12.16, all ps < 0.001. In addition, arousal ratings were
signiﬁcantly higher for the male angry face (M = 4.97; SD = 2.98)
compared to both happy facial expressions (female happy face:
M = 2.94; SD = 2.53; male happy face: M = 3.06; SD = 2.62),
all ts > 3.30, all ps < 0.003, but not for the female angry facial
expressions (female angry face: M = 3.69; SD = 2.92) compared
to all happy facial expressions, all ts < 1.27, all ps > 0.21.
DISCUSSION
The present study yielded evidence that task-irrelevant, but
fear-relevant, angry faces exert a bias on choices in ambiguous
situations, which is pronounced in individuals with elevated levels
of social anxiety. This inﬂuence was observed in an experimen-
tal gambling task linking advantageous choices with angry facial
expressions. The present ﬁndings were not explained by age, sex,
state anxiety, logical reasoning, or risky decision making. Overall,
all participants combined made fewer advantageous choices with
angry facial expressions at the beginning. Furthermore, partic-
ipants successively learned to make more advantageous choices,
but did not exhibit a clear preference for the advantageous decks
at the end.
These ﬁndings may suggest a more universal bias of angry facial
expressions on decision making which is not limited to elevated
levels of social anxiety and avoidance. Indeed, previous stud-
ies reported a similar initial bias of angry facial expressions on
rational choices for healthy participants (Averbeck and Duchaine,
2009). However, in this previous study the bias was limited to
early trials and participants integrated feedback information to
change their decisions. In the present study, this correction to
initial decisions was also evident in explicit contingency ratings
and increasing advantageous choices across the task. However,
across all participants no clear preference for the advantageous
choices was found by the end of the task. The latter results are
not in line with most ﬁndings of healthy participants complet-
ing the original Iowa Gambling Task (e.g., Bechara et al., 1997,
1999, 2000; Brand et al., 2007). There may be different explana-
tions for this mismatch of contingency awareness and persisting
behavioral preference toward happy facial expressions at the end
of the task.
In line with the ﬁnding of a universal bias, angry facial expres-
sions may have exerted a more sustained bias on decision making
behavior than on cognitive evaluation (contingency awareness)
in our study. This sustained bias would have led to fewer selec-
tions of angry facial expressions despite developing knowledge of
an advantageous outcome of these decks (for examples of dis-
crepant evaluation and behavior see Strack and Deutsch, 2014).
Alternatively, it is not clear when precisely participants acquired
awareness of contingencies, because explicit awareness was only
assessed after completion of the task. Due to the limited expe-
rience with the advantageous decks at the beginning, it may be
possible that participants became explicitly aware only during the
last blocks of the task. Whereas this late awareness can be seen
in explicit knowledge after the task, it would be too late to result
in a signiﬁcant preference of advantageous choices. To further
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clarify the mismatch of contingency awareness and a behavioral
preference, future researchmay, therefore, incorporate online con-
tingency and expectancy ratings throughout the task (e.g., seeMaia
and McClelland, 2004).
INITIAL CHOICES, SOCIAL AVOIDANCE, AND EMOTIONAL RESPONSES
Across all participants, the decks with angry facial expressions
were avoided initially. As hypothesized, these avoidant decisions
were more pronounced in participants with a higher level of social
avoidance. This effect of social avoidance was, however, limited
to the beginning of the task when contingencies were still obscure
and vanquished at the end of the task. These results are in line
with recent ﬁndings of a bias on initial decisions in healthy par-
ticipants (Averbeck and Duchaine, 2009). In this study, healthy
participants also showed initial avoidance of angry compared to
happy facial expressions, which diminished in later trials. In the
present study, this initial avoidance of angry facial expressions was
elevated in individuals with elevated levels of social anxiety. These
present results further support recent studies that found similar
avoidant decisions in individuals with fear of spiders (Pittig et al.,
2014a) and in healthy participants after fear conditioning experi-
ence (Pittig et al., 2014b). Thus, avoidant decision making under
uncertainty seems to be common across different types of fear
and anxiety. Detailed understanding of the underlying mecha-
nisms of development and reduction of avoidant decisions may
inform behavioral treatments which target pathological avoidance
behaviors.
For initial choices, a signiﬁcant interaction was found between
social avoidance and anticipatory SCRs before choosing an advan-
tageous deck with angry facial expressions. Only high social avoid-
ance in combination with higher anticipatory SCRs resulted in
fewer choices of angry facial expressions. This interaction provides
evidence that avoidance is not triggered by angry facial expres-
sions for every individual with high levels of social avoidance,
but rather depends on congruent elevated emotional responses.
As social anxiety represents a multidimensional construct with
multiple stimuli and cognitive processes as potential triggers for
anxious responses (Hofmann et al., 2004; Bögels et al., 2010), it is
likely that angry facial expressions were not fear-relevant stimuli
for all participants with elevated levels of social anxiety. This may
have resulted in lower emotional responses and subsequently in
missing avoidant decisions for some participants.
As SCRs are sensitive to many cognitive and affective processes,
it is difﬁcult to interpret the speciﬁc interaction effects with-
out doubt. Previous research suggested different explanations for
anticipatory SCRs in the Iowa gambling task, for example, growing
awareness of contingencies or reward and punishment expectan-
cies (for a review see Dunn et al., 2006). Previous studies, however,
did not ﬁnd any speciﬁc anticipatory reactions in the initial block
of the task (Bechara et al., 1997). In addition, the present results
indicate that the interaction of social avoidance and emotional
responses was speciﬁc for decks with angry facial expressions.
Findings, thus, may favor the interpretation that the initial bias
on decisions was related to the angry facial expressions. It seems
that early responses to the angry facial expressions may have been
the most prominent information for initial decisions. Whereas
the facial expressions can be identiﬁed immediately, task-relevant
information or emotional labels related to gains and losses tend
to develop at a later stage (Bechara et al., 1997; Brand et al., 2007).
Thus, fear-relevant informationmayhavehad the strongest impact
under uncertainty due to missing explicit knowledge. With little
knowledge about outcomes, individuals with a high tendency to
avoid social stimuli and situations may have followed their default
avoidance strategy if they experienced higher emotional responses.
However, pronounced avoidance in highly avoidant individ-
uals was limited to initial trials of the gambling task, when the
contingencies were not yet detected. In later trials, no effect of
elevated social avoidance was found above and beyond the gen-
eral tendency to choose fewer cards from the decks with angry
facial expressions (advantageous decks) across all participants.
Thus, pronounced avoidance was limited to trials with uncer-
tainty about gain-related consequences, in which it is likely that
no strong conﬂict between avoidance and approach was evident.
After further experience with the contingencies, initial avoidance
may have been overcome in the presence of an opposing reward-
related goal. In the present subclinical sample, socially avoidant
individuals did not engulf long-term costs. This ﬁndings differs
from our previous ﬁndings in a sample of spider fearful par-
ticipants, where avoidant decisions were more consistent (Pittig
et al., 2014a). Possibly, these differences may be explained by the
speciﬁcity of the fear-relevant stimuli. Whereas spiders are spe-
ciﬁc fear-relevant stimuli for spider-fearful individuals, multiple
stimuli, and cognitive processes may trigger anxious responses in
social anxiety, as mentioned above (Hofmann et al., 2004; Bögels
et al., 2010).
Current decision-making theories further highlight the impor-
tance of emotional and cognitive inﬂuences in decision making
(Bechara et al., 1997; Loewenstein et al., 2001). Changes in both
processes could have inﬂuenced the decrease in the effect of
avoidance over time. First, participants were exposed to the
same pictures in all 100 trials. This could have caused a habit-
uation of emotional responses to the angry facial expressions.
Thus, initial avoidance may have decreased due to reduced
aversiveness of the angry facial expressions, which were sub-
sequently not strong enough to bias decisions persistently. In
addition, research on the Iowa gambling task showed that uncer-
tainty is especially pronounced during the initial block, whereas
explicit knowledge starts to develop in block 2 or 3 (Brand et al.,
2007). With more experience, more explicit knowledge about the
beneﬁts of selecting the angry facial expressions was acquired.
This acquisition of explicit knowledge may have mitigated the
effect of the angry facial expressions and fostered the approach
tendency.
LEARNING ACROSS THE TASK, TRAIT ANXIETY, AND EMOTIONAL
RESPONSES TO LOSSES
First results suggested a general negative effect of trait anxiety on
advantageous decision making. This effect was further clariﬁed by
a signiﬁcant interaction between trait anxiety and SCRs after early
losses. High trait anxiety combined with low SCRs was associated
with impaired learning of advantageous decisions. Conversely,
elevated learning of advantageous choices occurred in high trait
anxiety in combination with higher SCRs to losses during initial
decisions.
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These ﬁndings can be linked to previous studies on the impact
of high trait anxiety and SCRs on decision making in the orig-
inal Iowa gambling task. First, prior studies also reported a
link between feedback SCRs and decision making (Suzuki et al.,
2003; Lawrence et al., 2006) and showed that participants with
higher SCRs to losses performed better in the Iowa gambling task
(Starcke et al., 2009). Regarding elevated levels of trait anxiety, pre-
vious resultsweremixed.Whereas someﬁndings suggest a negative
impact of high trait anxiety on decision making (Miu et al., 2008),
others contrarily suggest a beneﬁcial effect (Werner et al., 2009).
Here, the latter ﬁndings supported a positive correlation between
high trait anxiety and physiological responses to feedback. Com-
bined, these ﬁndings may suggest that the effect of trait anxiety in
the present study could be more closely linked to outcome-related
features of the task than to the facial expressions. This may indi-
cate that stronger emotional responses can augment advantageous
decision making, if they are related to goal-relevant features of the
task.
The impact of initial reaction to losses was not observed in par-
ticipants with low trait anxiety. This speciﬁcity of early losses in
high trait anxiety may be linked to a higher loss aversion in highly
anxious individuals (see Hartley and Phelps, 2012). In addition,
the immediate impact of emotional responses on decision mak-
ing may be lower in low trait anxious individuals, whereas the use
of cognitive strategies may be more pronounced. Such cognitive
strategies depend on explicit knowledge, which starts to develop at
a later stage of the task (Brand et al., 2007). In contrast to the use
of cognitive strategies, high trait anxious individuals may be more
engaged in emotional reasoning. Here, the impact of responses to
early losses could be mediated by a higher perceived intensity of
negative outcomes in high trait anxious individuals (Maner and
Schmidt, 2006) and the tendency to use fewer cues in reasoning
tasks (Leon and Revelle, 1985). Thus, if highly trait anxious indi-
viduals show elevated responses to goal-relevant features, theymay
be more prone to immediately direct future decisions following
these information.
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
There are some limitations to the present study which may be rel-
evant for future research. First, we treated anxiety and depression
as dimensions rather than nosological categories and participants
were not selected for clinical levels of anxiety or depression. We
expect that the effects observed here may be even be more pro-
nounced in more severe degrees of anxiety an in patients with
SAD. For example, individuals with clinical levels of social avoid-
ance may show a more consistent pattern of avoidant decisions.
However, a discussion of potential perspectives of social pho-
bia warrants further examination in clinical populations. Future
research may, therefore, replicate the present ﬁndings within a
sample of patients with SAD. Similarly, the impact of clinical lev-
els of depression may be tested. Results from our study in fear
of spiders suggest that effects of fear-relevant stimuli on avoidant
decisions may be similar in above-threshold individuals (Pittig
et al., 2014a).
Second, whereas the present sample size provided enough
power to detect effects of social avoidance and trait anxiety, it
might not be large enough to detect small effects of the remaining
variables. Future research may, for example, further investigate
potential effects of gender, age, intelligence, or risky decision mak-
ing in general. However, this was not the primary focus of the
present study and controlling for these variables did not change
the main results.
Third, exclusion criteria, especially the absence of medical or
other psychiatric conditions were only assessed via self-report
of the participants. No standardized clinical interviews were
completed to more thoroughly rule out a history of psychiatric
disorders. Although this might have resulted in a miss of speciﬁc
or past psychiatric symptoms, the current samplemainly consisted
of students. Nevertheless, future research may incorporate stan-
dardized interview to further examine the role of different or past
psychiatric symptoms.
Fourth, awareness of reward contingencies was only assessed
after completion of the task. This procedure was used to prevent
a potential bias of repeated contingency ratings throughout the
task on learning of an advantageous strategy. However, it remains
unclear when participants developed awareness of contingencies
and if they still continued to avoid the angry facial expressions
afterward. In order to further clarify the relationship between
explicit knowledge of reward contingencies and the effect of angry
facial expressions, future research may incorporate online contin-
gency and expectancy ratings throughout the task (e.g., see Maia
and McClelland, 2004).
CONCLUSION
In summary, angry facial expressions trigger avoidant decisions in
individuals with elevated levels of social anxiety, but only in those
who initially experience strong emotional responses toward these
stimuli. Emotional responses can also be beneﬁcial and increase
advantageous decision making, if they are goal-relevant. This
highlights the opposing impact of emotions on decision mak-
ing and calls for the need to account for both types of emotional
responses when investigating avoidance behavior in anxiety.
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